Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Yuanbo Hu; Ruiyuan Cong; Ran Teng; Baolong Ji · 2025-11-25 · PLOS One
As the Fourth Industrial Revolution advances, technological innovation has emerged as a key driver for firms to shape core competitiveness. The corporate governance literature recognizes CEO personality traits as key determinants of a firm’s technological innovation. Drawing on Upper Echelons Theory and Behavioral Agency Theory, this study investigates the effect of CEO greed on corporate technological innovation using a sample of China’s A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2023. We find that: (1) CEO greed significantly fosters corporate technological innovation. (2) Analyst coverage strengthens the positive relationship between CEO greed and corporate technological innovation. (3) This effect varies significantly across different firms and industries. (4) CEO greed significantly promotes exploitative (shorter-cycle) innovation, but has no significant effect on exploratory (longer-cycle) innovation.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Zhibin Zhang; Lishu Zhang; Aihua Xiong · 2024-05-02 · PLOS ONE
With an increasing number of heterogeneous shareholders participating in corporate governance in reality, the assumption of shareholder homogeneity in agency theory is gradually relaxing in the modern field of corporate governance. The policy of mixed ownership reform in China provides empirical evidence for studying heterogeneous shareholder governance. To fully understand the governance effects of non-state shareholders, we employ the ownership proportion held by non-state shareholders among the top ten shareholders and the appointment of directors as measures for non-state shareholder governance. Using a panel fixed-effect model from the perspective of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) party organizations, we examine the impact of non-state shareholder governance on the governance level of SOEs. The study reveals that non-state shareholder governance positively affects the governance level of SOEs, with board resolutions playing a crucial role in this relationship. When party members serve as directors, the governance effect of non-state shareholders is more significant. Based on the aforementioned research findings, we recommend further refining corporate governance measures for SOEs within the context of SOE reforms. It is advisable to optimize the party organizational governance structure and leverage the synergistic effects of non-state shareholder governance and party organizational governance. Advancing reforms along the Pareto improvement path will contribute to establishing a distinctive corporate governance system for Chinese SOEs.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Han Sun · 2023-11-30 · PLOS ONE
Financial reporting quality is critical for businesses, stakeholders, and government to ensure transparency and accountability. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance, financial reporting quality, and ownership structure as a moderating factor for Chinese stock exchange-listed firms. Quantitative data of 550 listed firms from 2012 to 2022 are collected from the annual reports. For investigating the relationship between variables, panel data analysis with random and fixed effect models is used. Our results show that corporate governance’s different attributes such as Auditor brand name, Existence of an audit committee, independent board, family ownership, and profitability have a significant negative impact on the audit report lag that decreases the lags and increases the financial reporting quality in China listed firms. Auditor opinion, Board diligence Board size, and CEO duality have a significant positive impact on the audit report lag that increases the lags and decreases the financial reporting quality of China-listed firms. Furthermore, our findings show that ownership concentration has no moderating effect between corporate governance, different attributes, and financial reporting quality. Family ownership, on the other hand, has a strong moderating effect between corporate governance characteristics and financial reporting quality. However, due to limitations, this study provides the opportunity for future research on corporate governance mechanisms in different cultures and environments. Moreover, this study has some important implications for investors, policymakers, and government.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Xiaofei Shi; Yuanhao Shen; Yuanfang Wang; Jinlong Han · 2025-06-11 · PLOS One
Tax avoidance is a widespread problem, much explored in the literature. Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2021, this study finds that analyst coverage significantly inhibits corporate tax avoidance behavior, mainly by improving the information environment and alleviating agency problems. Further analysis finds that the role of analyst coverage is more significant in firms where investment in innovation is limited, state-owned enterprises, and those with low management shareholding. The paper enriches the relevant literatures about analyst coverage and corporate tax avoidance, identifies the potential to inhibit corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of information environment and agency costs and provides suggestions for regulators and corporate governance.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Kanghong Li; Xiuying Wang; Yongqi Luo; Zixiao Li · 2026-02-02 · PLOS One
In the deepening stage of the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises from “mixed equity” to “reform mechanism”, how to stimulate the vitality of enterprise innovation through effective reform of corporate governance mechanism has become a core issue related to the success or failure of the reform. Existing research mostly focuses on the equity structure of non-state-owned shareholders, but generally ignores the power allocation of the board of directors, which is a key link in transforming equity advantages into governance efficiency. Based on the perspective of board functions, this paper discusses the impact and mechanism of the board of directors’ board power on the innovation investment of state-owned enterprises from 2008 to 2022. The research finds that the power of non-state-owned shareholders in the board has a significant promotion effect on SOEs’ innovation investment. The results of the robustness test show that such a finding holds. According to mechanism analysis, the interplay intensity in the board serves as sort of mediator for the impacts of the power of non-state-owned shareholders in the board on SOEs’ innovation investment. The power of state-owned shareholders in the board plays an inverted U-shaped role in the positive promotion exerted by the power of non-state-owned shareholders in the board on SOEs’ innovation investment, that is, along with the expansion of the power of state-owned shareholders in the board, the positive impacts of the power of non-state-owned shareholders in the board on innovation investment are reinforced before being inhibited.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Hangbo Liu; Xuemeng Guo; Dachen Sheng · 2025-07-11 · PLOS One
In this research, we use Chinese stock exchange listed firm data to explore the relationship between institutional analysts’ firm visits and firms’ risk-taking as measured by earnings quality. The results show that more frequent visits in the previous year increase managers’ risk-taking decisions in later years and that firms experience lower earnings quality. Interestingly, the concentration of shareholding and management power, traditionally believed to be negative corporate governance instruments, alleviate such risk-taking if a firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE). For non-SOEs, the more concentrated the shareholding and management power the further the risks increase. These results are attributed to the political connection of the manager, which would make managers more risk averse when under market focus and minimize risks that would damage their reputation and political career.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Siyuan Yu; Ming Tian · 2024-10-03 · PLOS ONE
The impact of the degree and effectiveness corporate social responsibility (CSR) fulfillment on corporate value assessment by investors is significant. However, prior research on effects of CSR on stock price crash risk has showed contrasting results. Certain studies suggest that an abundance of CSR can become a self-serving tool for management. This may lead to concealing and accumulating negative information, resulting in stock price collapse. Based on principal-agent theory, we suggest that CSR equilibrium could be an effective approach to prevent the concealment of negative events by managers. Employing data from Chinese A-share listed companies spanning 2010 to 2020, we examine how CSR equilibrium and corporate governance levels influence the risk of stock price collapse across entities with different property rights. Empirical findings indicate that a balanced distribution of CSR can mitigate the risk of stock price collapse. Furthermore, we find that higher levels of corporate governance can mitigate the negative impact of CSR equilibrium on stock price collapse risk. Interestingly, this governance effect is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises compared to private enterprises, where the likelihood of hiding adverse information is higher. Additionally, it provides a theoretical explanation for the impact of CSR equilibrium on the risk of stock price collapse, based on the principal-agent problem, thereby expanding the applicability of the theory. Practically, the research findings carry significant implications for listed companies, CSR rating agencies, and investors.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Niannian Wu; Furong Guo; Bingxia Wang · 2025-05-28 · PLOS One
Using data from Chinese A-share listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) between 2007 and 2019, we examine how mergers and acquisitions (M&As) affect SOE innovation through patent outputs, with a focus on mixed-ownership M&As where SOEs acquire private firms. Our results show that while M&As generally enhance SOE innovation through increased patent applications, mixed-ownership M&As demonstrate significantly stronger positive effects compared to SOE-to-SOE M&As. This enhancement is most notable when control rights are transferred, when acquiring SOEs possess high R&D investment but lower production efficiency, and in regions with less developed markets. The primary mechanism appears to be improved corporate governance through increased private shareholder involvement in strategic decision-making. These findings advance our understanding of how ownership differences influence innovation in M&As while providing practical guidance for SOE reform policies in China and similar emerging economies.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Junhui Li; Xianzhi Zhang · 2025-04-22 · PLOS One
Digital transformation has a significant impact on the choice of management control modes within enterprise groups. This study uses data from publicly listed companies in China from 2010 to 2022 to empirically examine the effect of digital transformation on the management control modes of enterprise groups. It further explores the mechanism and moderating effects of digital transformation in influencing the selection of management control modes. The findings indicate that, under the impact of digital transformation, enterprise groups are more inclined to adopt decentralized management control modes. The mechanism analysis suggests that digital transformation can mitigate principal-agent problems between parent and subsidiary companies by improving internal control quality, thus promoting a decentralized management control mode. The moderating effects reveal that the facilitative impact of digital transformation on choosing a decentralized control mode is more pronounced in state-owned enterprise groups and those operating in environments with higher uncertainty. Moreover, as the level of digital transformation or corporate governance improves, enterprise groups are more likely to adopt decentralized management control modes. This study extends the measurement indicators for the choice of management control modes in enterprise groups across four dimensions: personnel authority, operational authority, investment authority, and financial authority, and constructs a research framework to reveal the practical effects of China’s digital transformation strategy.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Bao Qi; Fan Hu; Chen Zhang · 2026-04-01 · PLOS One
While prior research has examined macroeconomic drivers of corporate financialization, little is known about how top executives’ personal traits shape this phenomenon. Drawing on imprinting theory, this study investigates whether and how CEOs’ academic backgrounds influence corporate financialization. Using data from Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies (2010–2022), we employ multiple regression analyses to test the relationships and underlying mechanisms. The results show that CEOs with academic backgrounds significantly reduce corporate financialization, particularly in non-state-owned enterprises and firms with lower analyst coverage. Further analysis using a mediating effect model indicates that managerial myopia and physical capital investment partially mediate the relationship between CEOs’ academic backgrounds and corporate financialization. These findings fill an important gap in the literature by revealing a micro-level behavioral channel that complements macro-level explanations of financialization. The study extends imprinting theory by identifying academic experience as a distinctive managerial imprint that shapes ethical and long-term financial decision-making, and it provides practical implications for executive selection, governance improvement, and sustainable corporate development in emerging markets.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Cheng Li; Yewen Wang · 2024-07-19 · PLOS ONE
Based on data from A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021, this study constructs an enterprise resilience index using the entropy-weighted TOPSIS method. On this basis, the impact of digital transformation on enterprise resilience is examined through empowerment theory. The empirical results indicate that digital transformation significantly enhances enterprise resilience, a conclusion that remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis reveals that digital transformation enhances enterprise resilience by reducing agency costs, increasing information transparency, and alleviating financing constraints. Heterogeneity analysis shows that micro-characteristics of enterprises, such as the stage of the life cycle and factor intensity, as well as macro-environmental factors like regional intellectual property rights protection and industry competition level, have differential impacts on the resilience-enhancing effects of digital transformation. Further analysis suggests that the level of corporate governance influences the positive impact of digital transformation on enterprise resilience.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Bing Zhou; Bo Liang; Licheng Bie · 2024-06-12 · PLOS ONE
The impact of macroeconomic policy uncertainty (EPU) on micro-level entities has garnered increasing attention in economic circles. This study examines the influence of EPU on the efficiency of investments made by China’s A-share listed companies between 2016 and 2021. Using a panel fixed effect model for analysis, the research reveals that EPU has a notable adverse effect on the investment efficiency of enterprises. Furthermore, it suggests that advancements in digital finance, strong ESG performance, and enhanced entrepreneurial confidence can mitigate this negative impact effectively. The study also highlights that enterprises with lower valuation, shareholder control, limited audit reputation, and no bank connections are more vulnerable to the impact of EPU on investment efficiency compared to those with higher valuation, manager control, strong audit reputation, and bank connections. Consequently, future efforts should be directed towards enhancing the stability and relevance of economic policies, promoting digital finance, and enhancing corporate governance structures.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Chunhua Cai; Yannan Geng; Fufei Yang · 2024-07-11 · PLOS ONE
In recent years, sustainable development and green growth and performance of companies in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) has received widespread attention from all sectors of society. Based on panel data of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2022, this study employs a two-way fixed effects model to explore the mechanism of the relationship between ESG practices and corporate value, as well as the moderating effect of executive characteristics within this relationship. The results indicate a robust positive relationship between ESG practices and corporate value. However, this relationship is moderated by the academic backgrounds of senior executives, who negatively influence it, and by male executives, who exert a positive moderating effect. Furthermore, this study reveals the variable impacts of ESG practices in different corporate settings, industries, and institutional frameworks. Moreover, it demonstrates how ESG practices boost corporate value through an enhanced reputation and increased government innovation subsidies. It offers new insights on the strategic value of ESG for corporations and policymakers. It also extends the theoretical framework by integrating attention-based and upper echelons perspectives into the ESG discourse.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Li Zhang; Wunhong Su; Shanqiu Liu · 2024-03-11 · PLOS ONE
Driven by innovation strategy, Chinese enterprises’ innovation investment, and research and development capability have been continuously improved, and the audit risk caused by this has attracted widespread attention from the academic community. This study takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2021 as samples to empirically test the relationship between innovation input and audit pricing of Chinese enterprises. Research shows that the higher the innovation investment, the higher the audit cost. High-quality corporate governance, sufficient research and development personnel, research and development subsidies, and operating cash flow can all play a negative moderating role. A good innovation environment will weaken the positive influence between innovation input and audit fees. This study theoretically confirms the risk-oriented audit pricing mechanism, which is of great significance for optimizing enterprise innovation risk management and improving audit service levels.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Xiaoping Huo; Yunpei Zhao; Zhihao Dong · 2024-06-25 · PLOS ONE
The inefficiency observed in investment within state-owned enterprises presents a significant practical challenge that can affect the sustainable development of China’s economy. To address this issue, this study comprehensively explores the intricate mechanisms underlying the governance implications of mixed ownership on the investment efficiency of listed companies. Drawing on unbalanced panel data encompassing Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share listed companies in China spanning the period from 2008 to 2022, this study employs a fixed-effects model to unveil the nuanced ways in which mixed ownership influences investment efficiency through the lens of agency costs. This study transcends the boundaries of traditional agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. It delves deeper, illuminating the diverse effects of agency conflicts between significant controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The results revealed a noteworthy positive correlation between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, and verified the intermediary role of agency costs between mixed ownership and investment efficiency, which is an important result of our research. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that the relationship between the two can be affected by external events, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic, investment efficiency is not the most concerned issue for enterprises. The findings have practical implications for practitioners and policymakers, as they offer avenues for optimizing investment strategies and fostering efficient and effective corporate governance practices.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Xin Song; Xiaodi Liu; Huiyu Chen · 2024-05-13 · PLOS ONE
To stimulate economic growth, China has launched multiple economic stimulus plans in recent years, intensifying corporate debt financing and subsequently elevating the leverage levels. Addressing and effectively reducing the leverage levels of our country’s enterprises has emerged as a pressing issue in the trajectory of our economic development. This paper primarily investigates the drivers, pathways, and mechanisms for reversing the over-leveraged values of enterprises. Key findings include: (1) Excessive indebtedness exerts a negative impact on corporate value, with the suppressing effect intensifying as the degree of over-leverage increases; (2) Over-leveraged enterprises can effectively decrease their debt levels and enhance their value through private placement. Further research suggests that this mechanism operates by amplifying the operational leverage of over-leveraged enterprises post private placement and alleviating financing constraints, thereby elevating corporate value. (3) Compared to non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises exhibit higher levels of indebtedness. Among over-leveraged firms, enhancements in corporate governance and increased investment efficiency can positively transform corporate value. This study offers valuable insights for the ongoing supply-side structural reforms and governance guidance from the regulatory bodies.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Walter Daniel Ovelar-Fernández; María del Mar Gálvez-Rodríguez; Carmen Caba-Pérez · 2022-01-05 · PLoS ONE
This paper contributes to the lack of longitudinal studies concerning online information access to corporate governance (CG) practices in the banking sector of Latin American countries. In particular, this study aims to analyze the factors that influence information transparency, both mandatory and voluntary, related to CG practices of banks that operate in Paraguay via their websites from 2016 to 2019. Findings indicate the need to improve the level of information available on websites, with disclosure of voluntary information on CG practices being more prevalent than the disclosure of mandatory information. Likewise, banks that operate in Paraguay have made scant “progress” regarding online access to their governance information over the years analyzed. Moreover, the factors “Bank size” and “listed status” positively influence the information transparency regarding CG practices of Paraguayan banks. In contrast, “leverage,” “liquidity,” “size of the audit firm,” and “credit risk rating” are factors that have a negative relation with the extent of CG disclosure.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Peiqiong Wang; Xianhua Zhang; Taozhi Wang; Zilu Wan · 2023-09-08 · PLOS ONE
As a crucial component of internal corporate governance, remuneration controls possess the potential to influence the cash holdings of firms. However, identifying the causal relationship between these controls and such holdings presents a considerable challenge. To address this research gap, this paper leverages the implementation of China’s Guidance on Further Regulating the Remuneration Management of Heads of Central Enterprises as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relationship between executive remuneration controls and firms’ cash holdings, utilizing a double-difference approach. Based on an analysis of a sample of listed companies from 2007–2012, the results indicate that firms subject to regulated executive compensation exhibit lower cash holdings. To ensure the robustness of these findings, various statistical techniques such as parallel trend tests, variable replacement, propensity score matching, and placebo tests were employed. Additionally, a mechanism test was conducted, whereby the mediating effect of executive compensation controls on firms’ cash holdings was examined, revealing a reduction in internal agency costs. Finally, the analysis of heterogeneity demonstrated that the impact of executive compensation controls on firms’ cash holdings was more pronounced in companies with high-quality internal controls, stronger management oversight, and lower information asymmetry.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Wang PeiZhi; Muhammad Ramzan · 2020-02-27 · PLoS ONE
A superlative combination of the Board of Directors (BOD) with diverse members is considered a sign of a good governance structure. Meanwhile, the key decision taken by BOD to make organizations profitable is the capital structure with the optimal mix of debt and equity. Unfortunately, previous literature has reported this relationship with a mixed trend, which may be due to research gaps in the statistical analysis. Moreover, it also shows that the relationship between them has not yet been fully predicted and can still be completely understood. This study contains time-variant and time-invariant variables, and these variables usually have an outlier’s problem. As we know that the OLS estimators are more sensitive to react adversely to this problem, yet we have not received enough evidence from similar researches that cares about it. Consistent with these arguments, this study focuses primarily on exploring the influence of corporate governance structure and the capital structure on firms' market-oriented and accounting-based performance, especially with the contemplation of outliers. Hypotheses have been evaluated using M-estimators and S-estimators of robust regression for 45 listed firms for the period from 2013 to 2017. The findings reveal that the governance structure of firms with BOD, independent director, institutional investors, audit committee and female directors accelerates its performance. Further, we find that the leverage ratio improves accounting performance, but it has a downward impact on the share prices of listed firms. Our study contributes to the prevailing literature by proving that the kind of governance structure that based on diverse expert members and a capital structure with a high volume of debt is of utmost importance to the performance of firms as a whole.
Research article · The Family Office Decision Book · Governance & investment discipline
Zhujia Yin; Lijuan Liu; Haidong Wang; Fengming Wen · 2018-04-03 · PLoS ONE
Based on the database data of Chinese industrial enterprises from 2000 to 2007 and the LP method, this paper measures the total factor productivity of enterprises and investigates the effect of different mixed ownership forms on enterprises’ efficiency and the effect of heterogeneous ownership balance on the mixed ownership enterprises’ efficiency. The state-owned enterprise and mixed ownership enterprise are identified by the enterprise’s paid-up capital. The results show that, on the whole, for the mixed ownership enterprise, the higher the diversification degree of the shareholders is, the higher the efficiency becomes, and in different types of industries, the mixed forms of shareholders have different effects on the efficiency of enterprises. The heterogeneous ownership balance and the enterprise efficiency show nonlinear U-type relationships. Both the higher and lower heterogeneous ownership balance degrees will promote the enterprise’s efficiency. However, when the ownership balance degree is in the range of [0.2 0.5], the increase in ownership balance will lead to the decline of enterprise efficiency. Therefore, when introducing non-state-owned capital, state-owned enterprises should take full account of their own characteristics by rationally controlling the shareholding ratio of non-state-owned capital and play the positive role of a mixed ownership structure in corporate governance with appropriate ownership balances.